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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a formal model for multilevel databases. This model aims at being a
generic model, that is it can be interpreted for any kind of database (relational, object-oriented…).
Our model has three layers. The first layer corresponds to a model for a non-protected database.
The second layer corresponds to a model for a multilevel database. In this second layer, we
propose a list of theorems that must be respected in order to build a secure multilevel database.
We also propose a new solution to manage cover stories without using the ambiguous technique of
polyinstantiation.  The third layer corresponds to a model for a MultiView database, that is, a
database that provides at each security level a consistent view of the multilevel database. Finally,
as an illustration, we interpret our 3-layer model in the case of an object-oriented database.
Keywords: Database Security, Security Model, Multilevel Security Policy, Cover Story
Management, Mathematical Logic.
21. Introduction
The work presented in this paper applies to the context of multilevel security policies. In a
multilevel security policy every piece of information is associated with a classification level, and
every agent is associated with a clearance level. Classification and clearance levels are taken
from a set of security levels associated with a partial order relation. Traditional examples of
security levels are U (Unclassified), C (Confidential), S (Secret) and TS (Top Secret) with the
following order relation: U < C < S < TS. The confidentiality property in the multilevel security
policy states that an agent can only know a given piece of information if the clearance level of this
agent is higher than or equal to the classification level of the information.
Projects, whose objective is to realize a database management system, which supports a multilevel
security policy, have been undertaken for more than twenty-five years. Several commercial
products coming from the main vendors of database management systems are now available.
Currently, database security is also an active field of research. Several theoretical models have
been suggested for multilevel databases (see for instance  [DLSSH88,Wil89,HOST90,SW92,
CS95,QL96,JK90,Lun90,ML92,KTT89]). However, none of them is fully satisfactory because they
are not free of semantic ambiguities. Most of these ambiguities come from the use of the concept
called polyinstantiation. Polyinstantiation occurs when different tuples with the same key, each at
a different classification level, are allowed. Even though models for multilevel security generally
include the possibility to have polyinstantiated tuples, there is currently no consensus on a non-
ambiguous interpretation of polyinstantiation.
The objective of this paper is to propose a formal model for multilevel database. This model is
then interpreted in the case of an object-oriented database. The proposed model has three layers
(see figure 1). The first layer corresponds to a model for a non-protected database. The second
layer corresponds to a model for a multilevel database. This multilevel database is obtained by
applying the classification process to data stored in the non-protected database. However, this
model includes the possibility of classifying data, which are not stored in the non-protected
database. These data correspond to cover stories. Cover stories are lies introduced in the
multilevel database in order to protect the existence of higher classified data. In this second layer,
it is possible to explicitly state which information is a cover story. We claim that this approach is
free of ambiguity and is therefore better than using polyinstantiation. Finally, the purpose of the
third layer is to derive, from the second layer, a consistent view of the multilevel database at each
security level.
We show that there is a one to one correspondence between the second layer and the third layer.
This means that, knowing how data are classified and which data are cover stories, we can
provide each user with a consistent view of the multilevel database. Conversely, knowing what is
the view of the multilevel database at each security level, we can derive how data are classified
and which data correspond to cover stories. From a more practical point of view, this also means
that there are two ways of implementing a multilevel database:
• storing how data are classified, which data are cover stories, and then deriving a view at each
security level (implementation of second layer) or,
3• storing a view at each security level and then deriving data classification and cover stories
(implementation of third layer). We argue that implementing the third layer is generally easier.
We illustrate it in the context of an object-oriented database.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a model for a non-
protected database (first layer of figure 1). Section 3 is a model for a multilevel database (second
layer). In this section, two inference control rules are introduced: the first rule, called deductive
channels control rule, is to prevent illegal inference of higher classified information; the second
one, called signalling channels control rule, is to protect the existence of sensitive information. We
also formally define the concept of cover story and provide means to explicitly state which data
are cover stories. Section 4 is a model for a MultiView database (third layer). We provide
axioms, which guarantee a one to one correspondence between the second and third layers.
Sections 5 through 7 provide interpretation of the three layers in the case of an object-oriented
database. In section 8, we suggest some ideas to implement a MultiView object-oriented database.
Finally, section 9 concludes this paper.
Non Protected DB Layer 1
Multilevel DB Layer 2
MultiView DB
Layer 3
Classification Process
Cover Stories
Layer2-Layer3
correspondence axioms
Figure 1. Three-layers model
2. Non-protected database
Mathematical logic has been used to formalize databases in two main directions. These directions
are usually called the proof theoretics approach and the model theoretics approach. The former
represents a database as a logical theory, the latter represents a database as an interpretation of a
logical theory [Rei83]. In the remainder of this paper, we adopt the proof theoretics approach, that
is, each database is associated with its logical theory T.
42.1. Language
The language L of the theory T is based on first-order logic with equality. Thus, in order to
represent the non-protected Database we use first-order predicates.
Example:
Employee(Dupont) (that reads “Dupont is an employee”)
Salary(Dupont,2000) (that reads “Dupont’s salary is 2000”)
2.2. Axiomatic
The axiomatic A of the theory T corresponds to the classical axiom schemata of first order logic
with equality plus some proper axioms.  These proper axioms are divided into two sets:
1. A set DB of atomic facts that represents the Database content
Example:
Employee(Dupont), Salary(Dupont,2000) …
2. A set IC of integrity constraints
Example:
∀x∀y,Salary(x, y) → Employee(x) (1)
(that reads “If x has a salary then x is an employee”)
∀x, Employee(x) → ∃y,Salary(x, y) (2)
(that reads “each employee has a salary”)
We shall assume that the database content enforces the set of integrity constraints, that is, the
integrity constraints may be derived from the database content: DB − IC
Among all possible types of integrity constraints, we distinguish two particular types of integrity
constraints that will be useful for the remainder of this paper.
• Type 1
 
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → Q(y) (3)
 where x1,…,xn are tuples of variables respectively compatible with the arity of predicates P1,…,Pn
and y is another tuple compatible with the arity of Q. We assume that each variable in tuple y
appears in at least one of the tuples x1,…,xn.
 Integrity constraint (1) is of Type 1.
• Type 2
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → ∃y,Q1(y1) ∧ K∧ Qp (yp ) (4)
where x1,…,xn, y1,…,yp are tuples of variables respectively compatible with the arity of predicates
P1,…,Pn, Q1,…,Qp and y is another tuple of variables. We assume that each variable in tuple y
5appears in at least one of the tuples y1,…,yp and each variable in tuples y1,…,yp appears in at least
one of the tuples x1,…,xn, y.
Integrity constraint (2) is of Type 2.
Finally, notice that we could have considered the following form of integrity constraint as another
particular Type 3:
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → Q1(y1) ∧ Q2(y2) ∧K ∧ Qp(yp )
where x1,…,xn are tuples of variables respectively compatible with the arity of predicates P1,…,Pn
and y1,…,yp are other tuples compatible with the arity of Q1,…,Qp. Each variable in tuples y1,…,yp
appears in at least one of the tuples x1,…,xn.
However such an integrity constraint can be decomposed into several integrity constraints of Type
1:
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → Q1(y1)
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → Q2 (y2)
…
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → Qp(yp )
3. Multilevel database
The central idea of our approach is to assign a classification level to any piece of information
represented by an atomic formula in the non-protected database.
Let us extend the theory T, used to represent the non-protected database, into a theory Tc, used to
represent the multilevel database.
3.1. Language
The language Lc used to represent the multilevel database is an extension of the language L
developed in section 2.1.
We first extend our language to represent a finite set of classification levels. For this purpose, we
shall use a one-place predicate level. The formula level(l) reads “l is a classification level”. We
assume that the set of levels is a lattice associated with a partial order relation ≤. Therefore, the
least upper bound and greatest lower bound are defined. For this purpose, we shall use two
functions lub and glb. If l1 and l2 are two security levels, then lub(l1, l2) and glb(l1, l2) are
respectively the least upper bound and greatest lower bound of l1 and l2. There is a level that is also
lower than all other levels, we denote it Low and a level that is higher than all other levels, we
denote it High. The formula l1 ≤ l2  reads “l1 is dominated by l2”. Axioms associated with the
predicates Level and ≤ are the following:
Only levels can be compared with ≤:
∀l1∀l2 , l1 ≤ l2 → level(l1) ∧ level(l2) (5)
6≤ is transitive:
∀l1∀l2∀l3, l1 ≤ l2 ∧ l2 ≤ l3 → l1 ≤ l3 (6)
≤  is reflexive:
∀l1,level(l1) → l1 ≤ l1 (7)
≤ is anti-symmetric:
∀l1∀l2 , l1 ≤ l2 ∧ l2 ≤ l1 → l1 = l2 (8)
In the remainder of this paper we shall also use < and <>:
The formula l1 < l2  reads “l1 is strictly dominated by l2”.
∀l1∀l2 , l1 < l2 ↔ l1 ≤ l2 ∧ ¬(l1 = l2 )
The formula l1 <> l2  reads “l1 and  l2 are not comparable”
∀l1∀l2 , l1 <> l2 ↔ level(l1 ) ∧ level(l2 ) ∧ ¬(l1 ≤ l2 ) ∧ ¬(l2 ≤ l1 )
For each predicate P of arity n, which is used to represent the non-protected database content,
there is a predicate Pc of arity (n+1). Predicates Pc are used to represent the multilevel database
content.  Intuitively, if l is a classification level then Pc(t1, …,tn,l) reads “the piece of information
P(t1,…,tn) is classified at level l”
Example:
In this example we assume that our set of security levels contains two security levels only
{(U)nclassified, (S)ecret}(High=S and Low=U).
Employeec(Dupont,U)
(that reads “the fact that Dupont is an employee is an unclassified information”)
Salaryc(Dupont,2000,S)
(that reads “the fact that Dupont’s salary is 2000 is a secret information”)
Notice that we might also apply the classification process to the predicates Level and ≤:
• We might consider a two place predicate Levelc with the sentence Levelc(l1, l2) which reads “the
fact that l1 is a security level is classified at level l2”. For example the fact
Levelc(Top_Secret,Secret) means that the Top Secret security level itself is classified at the
Secret level. As a consequence, only secret and top secret users can learn that there exists a
Top Secret level and therefore, there may be some top-secret data in the multilevel database.
However, for the sake of simplicity we do not include this possibility in our model. This
implicitly means that we assume the extension of the predicate Level to be classified at the
lowest level Low:
 ∀l
1
∀l
2
, level
c
(l
1
, l
2
) ↔ level(l
1
) ∧ l
2
= Low (9)
• We might consider a three place predicate ≤c with the sentence ≤c(l1, l2, l3) that reads “the fact
that level l1 is dominated by level l2 is classified at level l3”. We shall also not use this
7possibility in the remainder of this paper. This means that we assume the extension of the
predicate ≤ to be classified at the lowest level Low:
∀l1∀l2∀l3,≤
c
(l1,l2, l3 ) ↔ l1 ≤ l2 ∧ l3 = Low (10)
Finally, we assume the integrity constraints to be all implicitly classified at the lowest level low.
3.2. Axiomatic
The axiomatic Ac of the theory Tc includes the following axioms:
1. All axioms A of theory T (cf. section 2.2)
2. Axioms (5) to (10).
3. A set of atomic facts that represents the multilevel database content
Example:
Employee c(Dupont,U), Salary c(Dupont,2000,S) …
4. An axiom schema which is used to specify the link between the non-protected database and the
multilevel database:
For each n-place predicate P, we have the following axioms:
  
∀t1K∀tn ,P(t1,K,tn ) → ∃l, Level(l) ∧ P
c
(t1,K, tn, l) (11)
This axiom says that any fact in the non-protected database is classified in the multilevel
database.
5. An axiom schema saying that a fact cannot be associated with two distinct comparable security
levels.
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l∀ ′ l , P
c
(t1,K,tn ,l) ∧ P
c
(t1,K, tn , ′ l ) ∧ l ≤ ′ l → l = ′ l (12)
This axiom says that if a fact P(t1,…,tn) is classified with two levels l and l’ and if l’ dominates
l then l and l’ are the same. This axiom implicitly suggests that P(t1,…,tn) may be associated
with more than one security level provided these security levels cannot be compared between
each other.
Example :
Let us assume we have the following set of security levels:
{U, C1, C2, S}
The following partial order is defined in this set:
C1 > U, C2 > U, S > C1, S > C2 and C1 <> C2
According to axiom schema (12), Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Employee
c
(Dupont,C
1
)is not
possible since C1 > U whereas Employee
c
(Dupont,C
1
) ∧ Employee
c
(Dupont ,C
2
)is possible
since C1 <> C2 .
83.3. Inference channels control theorems
Our objective in this section is to derive general constraint theorems that must be enforced when
classifying the database content (for instance, what condition(s) must be satisfied when classifying
Salary(Dupont,2000) at level l and Employee(Dupont) at level l’ ?). These inference channels
control theorems can be classified into the following two categories:
• Deductive channels control theorems. These theorems must be respected in order to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of facts. They are derived from the integrity constraints of Type 1.
• Signalling channels control theorems. These theorems must be respected in order to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the existence of facts. They are derived from the integrity
constraints of Type 2.
3.3.1. Deductive channels control theorems
When classifying any piece of information at a given classification level, the following deductive
channels control rule must be enforced  (this rule is added to the axiomatic Ac):
• Rule 1
If 
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → Q(y) is an integrity constraint of Type 1 (see section 2.2) in
the non-protected database, then the following constraint must be enforced in the multilevel
database:
  
∀x1K∀xn∀l1K∀ln, P1
c
(x1,l1) ∧ K ∧ Pn
c
(xn , ln ) → ∃l,Q
c
(y,l) ∧ l ≤ lub( l1,l2,K, ln )
If this rule is not satisfied, then a subject cleared at level lub(l1,l2, … ,ln) can access every Pi(xi)
and use the axiom1 (3) to derive Q(y). In other words, if the classification of Q(y) is not lower than
or equal to lub(l1,l2, … ,ln) then a deductive channel that enables prohibited information to be
disclosed is created.
Example:
By directly applying Rule 1 onto axiom (1) we can derive the following theorem:
∀x∀y∀l∀ ′ l ,Salaryc (x, y, ′ l ) → ∃l, Employeec (x, l) ∧ l ≤ ′ l (13)
This theorem says that if the fact “y is the salary of x” is classified at level l’ then there must exist
a security level l protecting the fact that “x is an employee” with l’ dominating l.
3.3.2. Signalling channels control theorems
When classifying any piece of information at a given classification level, the following signalling
channels control rule must be enforced in order to protect the existence of sensitive information
(this rule is added to the axiomatic Ac):
                                                            
1
Recall that we implicitly assumed all integrity constraints to be classified at the lowest level Low. Now if we assume that integrity
constraints might be classified then the conclusion of Rule 1 would be modified as follows:
  
∀x
1
K∀xn∀ l1 K∀ln∀l, P1
c
( x
1
, l
1
) ∧ K ∧ Pn
c
(x n, ln ) → ∃l,Q
c
( y, l) ∧ l ≤ lub( l
1
, l
2
,K, ln ,lc )
where lc is the classification level of the integrity constraint used in the premise of Rule 1. If we assume that lc=Low then we
obtain Rule 1.
9• Rule 2
If 
  
∀x1K∀xn ,P1(x1) ∧K ∧ Pn (xn ) → ∃y,Q1(y1) ∧ K∧ Qp (yp ) is an integrity constraint of Type 2
(see section 2.2) in the non-protected database, then the following constraint must be enforced in
the multilevel database:
  
∀x1K∀xn∀l1K∀ln, P1c (x1,l1) ∧ K ∧ Pnc (xn ,ln )
→ ∃y∃ ′ l 1K∃ ′ l p ,Q1c (y1, ′ l 1) ∧ K∧ Qpc(yp, ′ l p ) ∧ lub( ′ l 1, ′ l 2 ,K, ′ l p ) ≤ lub(l1, l2,K,ln )
If this rule is not satisfied, then a subject cleared at level lub(l1,l2, … ,ln) can access every Pi(xi)
and use the axiom2 (4) to derive the existence of the facts Q1(y1), … , Qp(yp) whereas some of these
Qi(yi) are higher classified than lub(l1,l2, … ,ln). Therefore, a signalling channel that enables the
existence of prohibited information to be disclosed is created.
Example :
By directly applying Rule 2 onto axiom (2) we can derive the following theorem:
∀x∀l, Employeec (x,l) → ∃y∃ ′ l , Salaryc (x, y, ′ l ) ∧ l' ≤ l (14)
This theorem says that “if the fact that x is an employee is classified at level l then x must have a
salary y classified at a level l’ dominated by l.” Notice that in our particular example, by
combining theorem (13) and theorem (14) we obtain the following interesting theorem:
∀x∀l, Employeec (x,l) → ∃y,Salaryc(x,y,l) (15)
This theorem says, “if the fact that x is an employee is classified at level l then there must exist a
salary y for x classified at level l.”
Proof:
Let us assume that ∃x∃l, Employeec (x, l).
From (14) we can derive that ∃y∃ ′ l ,Salaryc(x, y, ′ l ) ∧ l' ≤ l
From (13) we can derive that ∃ ′ ′ l , Employeec (x, ′ ′ l ) ∧ ′ ′ l ≤ ′ l .
From (12) we can derive that l = ′ ′ l . Therefore since ′ ′ l ≤ ′ l ≤ l , we have l = ′ l 
Thus, we have ∀x∀l, Employeec (x,l) → ∃y∃l' , Salaryc(x, y, ′ l ) ∧ l = ′ l which is equivalent to (15).

3.4. Cover Story
3.4.1. Definition of a Cover Story
Axiom (11) (cf. section 3.2) says that each fact of the non-protected database is associated with a
security level in the corresponding multilevel database. Note that we might also state that each
                                                            
2
If we assume that integrity constraints might be classified then the conclusion of Rule 2 would be modified as follows:
  
∀x1K ∀xn∀l1K ∀ln , P1
c
( x1 , l1)
∧ K ∧ Pn
c
( xn , ln )
→ ∃y∃ ′ l 1K ∃ ′ l p , Q1
c
( y1,
′ l 1)
∧ K ∧ Q p
c
(y p ,
′ l p )
∧ lub ( ′ l 1 ,
′ l 2 ,K ,
′ l p )
≤ lub(l1, l2 ,K , ln , lc )
where lc is the classification level of the integrity constraint used in the premise of Rule 2. If we assume that lc=Low then we
obtain Rule 2.
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classified fact of the multilevel database also belongs to the non-protected database. This is
captured by the following sentence:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
c
(t1,K,tn ,l) → level(l) ∧ P(t1,K,tn ) (16)
This formula says that the extension of the Pc predicates is obtained by classifying facts belonging
to the extension of the P predicates. However, it is sometimes necessary to introduce in the
multilevel database some facts that do not belong to the non-protected database. For instance, let
us consider our example of section 3.1:
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,S )
This means, the fact “Dupont is an employee” is unclassified and the fact “2000 is Dupont’s
salary” is secret. Theorem (15) says that a value for Dupont’s salary must also be provided at the
unclassified level. For example, we may have:
Salaryc(Dupont,1500,U)
Semantically, value 1500 can have two interpretations:
• Employee Dupont has two salaries, one that is secret and equal to 2000 and one that is
unclassified and is equal to 1500.
• 1500 is a cover story that is, a lie unclassified users are provided with. This lie is used to hide
the existence of the more sensitive data 2000.
 Note that, in this example, 1500 cannot be interpreted as a second salary if one have the following
integrity constraint:
 ∀x∀y,Salary(x, y) ∧ Salary(x, ′ y ) → y = ′ y (17)
 Indeed in that case, employee Dupont cannot have two distinct salaries. If (17) is stated as an
integrity constraint then 1500 is automatically interpreted as a cover story.
 We formally define a cover story as follows:
• P(c1,…,cn) is a cover story iff (16) is not satisfied that is, there exists a level l such as
Pc(c1,…,cn,l) belongs to the multilevel database and P(c1,…,cn) does not belong to the non-
protected database.
In our example given above, Employee(Dupont) and Salary(Dupont,2000) are not cover stories
since Employeec(Dupont,U) and Salaryc(Dupont,2000,S) belong to the multilevel database and
Employee(Dupont) and Salary(Dupont,2000) belong to the non-protected database (cf. section
2.1). On the contrary, Salary(Dupont,1500) is a cover story since Salaryc(Dupont,1500,U)
belongs to the multilevel database but Salary(Dupont,1500) does not belong to the non-protected
database.
3.4.2. Honest predicates versus Liar predicates
In the previous section 3.4.1, we have seen that the Salaryc predicate may contain some cover
stories. Every predicate PC may actually contain some cover stories. For instance, let us consider
the following multilevel database:
11
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Employee
c
(Durand,U ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,S )
Now let us assume that the corresponding non-protected database is the following:
Employee(Dupont) ∧ Salary(Dupont,2000)
Employee(Durand) does not belong to the non-protected database whereas EmployeeC(Durand,U)
belongs to the multilevel database. According to the definition, Employee(Durand) is a cover
story. The fact that Durand is an employee is a lie.
However, if there is no need to introduce a cover story in Employeec, then the Security
Administrator may decide that (16) is an axiom for Employeec.
Thus, we define an Honest predicate as follows:
• A predicate Pc that satisfies (16) is an Honest predicate.
 We define a Liar predicate as follows:
• A predicate Pc that does not satisfy (16) is a Liar predicate.
The Security Administrator is completely free of deciding whether a predicate Pc is an Honest or a
Liar predicate. However depending on the predicate, such decision may have some consequences
on security (see section 3.4.4 below).
3.4.3. Cover Story management
Let us consider a secret user seeing the following multilevel database:
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,S ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,1500,U )
If we assume that (17) is not an integrity constraint then this secret user may find two possible
interpretations for Salaryc(Dupont,1500,U) (cf. section 3.4.1). He may think that 1500 is the value
of a second salary for Dupont or he may think that 1500 is a cover story used to hide from
unclassified users the actual secret value 2000. However, he has no means to know which of the
two interpretations is the correct one. Therefore, in order to make things clear for the secret user
there must be something in the multilevel database telling him whether 1500 is a cover story or a
second salary for Dupont. For this purpose, we propose to extend the theory Tc into a theory Tcs as
follows:
• The language Lcs is an extension of Lc (cf. section 3.1):
 For each Liar predicate Pc of arity n+1, there is a predicate Pcs of arity n+1. Predicates Pcs are
used to represent the cover stories.  Intuitively, if l is a classification level then Pcs(t1,…,tn,l) reads
“the fact that P(t1,…,tn) is a cover story is classified at level l”.
 Example:
 Salary
cs
(Dupont,1500, S) (that reads “the fact that Salary(Dupont,1500) is a cover story is
classified at level S”).
 
• The axiomatic Acs of the theory Tcs includes the following axioms:
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1. All axioms Ac of theory Tc (cf. section 3.2 + Rule 1 + Rule 2)
2. Axiom (16) for all Honest predicates.
3. A set of atomic facts that represents the cover stories.
Example : Salary
cs
(Dupont,1500, S)
4. A set of axioms which are used to specify the links between the P, Pc and Pcs predicates:
For each n-place predicate Pcs, we have the following axiom:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
cs
(t1,K, tn, l) → ∃ ′ l , ′ l < l ∧ P
c
(t1,K, tn , ′ l ) (18)
Axiom (18) says that if the fact that P(t1,…,tn) is a cover story is classified at level l then there
exists a level l’ strictly dominated by l such that P(t1,…,tn) is classified at level l’.
Note that from the axioms (18) and (12) we can derive the following theorem:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
cs
(t1,K, tn, l) → ¬P
c
(t1,K, tn , l) (19)
Theorem (19) says that if the fact that P(t1,…,tn) is a cover story is classified at level l then
P(t1,…,tn) cannot be classified at level l.
Proof:
Let us assume that 
  
∃t1K∃tn∃l, P
cs
(t1,K, tn , l) .
From (18) we can derive that 
  
∃ ′ l ,Pc(t1,K, tn, ′ l ) ∧ ′ l < l
Axiom (12) can be rewritten as 
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l∀ ′ l , P
c
(t1,K,tn ,l) ∧ l < ′ l → ¬P
c
(t1,K, tn , ′ l )
Therefore, from (12) and from 
  
P
c
(t1,K,tn , ′ l ) ∧ ′ l < l  we can derive that   ¬P
c
(t1,K, tn , l).

For each n-place predicate Pcs, we have the following axiom:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
c
(t1,K,tn ,l) ∧ ¬P(t1,K, tn) → ∃ ′ l , l < ′ l ∧ P
cs
(t1,K, tn , ′ l ) (20)
Axiom (20) says that if Pc(t1,…,tn,l) belongs to the multilevel database and if P(t1,…,tn) does not
belong to the non-protected database then P(t1,…,tn) is classified as a cover story at a level l’
strictly dominating l. Note that this axiom can also be rewritten as follows:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
c
(t1,K,tn ,l) → (P(t1,K, tn)∨ ∃l' , l < l'∧P
cs
(t1,K,tn , l' )) (20bis)
Finally, Acs is also extended with the following rule:
• Rule 3
In the following a1,…,an are tuples of constants respectively compatible with the arity of predicates
P1,…,Pn:
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If {P1(a1), P2(a2),..., Pn(an)}is a minimal inconsistent
3 set and
if we have 
  
P1
c
(a1,l1 ) ∧K ∧ Pn
c
(an, ln ) ∧ l = lub( l1,K,ln ),
then we have:
  
P1
cs
(a1,l) ∨ K∨ Pn
cs
(an,l)
This means, at least one of the Pi(ai) is a cover story and the fact that it is a cover story is
classified at level l.
In the following, we give simple examples of multilevel databases containing cover stories:
Example 1:
This first example shows how Rule 3 can sometimes allow us to implicitly derive that an atomic
fact is actually a cover story:
Let us consider the following database and let us assume that Salarycs is a Liar predicate:
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,S ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,1500,U )
and let us assume that a person’s salary must be unique, that is, (17) is an integrity constraint.
The set {Salary(Dupont,1500), Salary(Dupont,2000)}is then minimal inconsistent.
Moreover, since we have Salary
c
(Dupont ,2000,S) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont ,1500,U ), using Rule 3 we
can derive Salary
cs
(Dupont,2000, S) ∨ Salary
cs
(Dupont,1500,S ).
Salarycs(Dupont,2000,S) is not possible since it contradicts the theorem (19). Thus,
Salarycs(Dupont,1500,S) can be derived.
On the contrary, if (17) is not an integrity constraint then {Salary(Dupont,1500),
Salary(Dupont,2000)} is consistent. Therefore, if Salary(Dupont,1500) is really a cover story
(and not a second salary for Dupont) then the Security Administrator must explicitly introduce in
the multilevel database the fact Salarycs(Dupont,1500,S).
Example 2:
In this example both predicates EmployeeC and Salaryc are Liar predicates
Let us consider the following multilevel database and let us assume that a person can have several
salaries, that is, (17) is not an integrity constraint:
Employeec (Dupont,U )
∧Salaryc(Dupont,2000, S) ∧ Salaryc(Dupont,1500,U) ∧ Salaryc(Dupont ,1000,U )
∧Employeec(Durand,U ) ∧ Salaryc(Durand ,1000,U)
∧Employeecs (Durand,S) ∧ Salarycs (Dupont,1500, S) ∧ Salarycs(Durand,1000, S)
                                                            
3
 A set I is minimal inconsistent iff I is inconsistent and every strict subset of I is not inconsistent. I is inconsistent iff I
−¬IC  with
IC being the set of integrity constraints (see section 2.2) (If IC = {c1, c2,..., cn} with each ci being an integrity constraint then
  
¬IC = ¬(c1 ∧
c
2 ∧K ∧
cn ) = ¬c1 ∨ ¬c2 ∨ K∨ ¬cn ).
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This database satisfies axioms and theorems (12) to (15) plus (18) and (19)
In this example we have three cover stories:
1. Employee(Durand)
2. Salary(Durand,1000)
3. Salary(Dupont, 1500)
• Interpretation of data made by unclassified users is as follows:
 Unclassified users cannot see any cover story. Therefore, they think that EmployeeC and Salaryc are
Honest predicates. They learn that Dupont and Durand are employees. They learn that Dupont has
two salaries, 1000 and 1500. Finally they learn that Durand’s salary is 1000.
•  Interpretation of data made by secret users is as follows:
 Secret users can see all cover stories. They learn that the facts “Durand is an employee” and
“Durand’s salary is 1000” are lies. They learn that Dupont has two actual salaries, 1000 and 2000
and they learn that Dupont’s third salary, 1500, is a lie.
 Example 3:
 Let us assume we have the following set of security levels:
 {U, C1, C2, S}
 The following partial order is defined in this set:
 C1 > U, C2 > U, S > C1, S > C2 and C1 <> C2
 Let us also assume that a person’s salary is unique, that is, (17) is an integrity constraint.
 
Employeec (Dupont,C1) ∧ Employee
c(Dupont,C2 )
∧Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,C1 ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,1500,C2 )
∧Salarycs (Dupont,1500,S )
 This database satisfies axioms and theorems (12) to (15) plus (18) and (19)
 In this example we have one cover story:
 Salary(Dupont, 1500)
• Unclassified users see an empty database.
• Interpretation of data made by C1 users is as follows:
 C1 users cannot see the cover story. Therefore, they think that Salary
c is an Honest predicate. They
learn that Dupont is an employee and that his salary is 1500.
• Interpretation of data made by C2 users is as follows:
 C2 users cannot see the cover story. Therefore, they also think that Salary
c is an Honest predicate.
They learn that Dupont is an employee and that his salary is 2000.
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• Interpretation of data made by secret users is as follows:
Secret users can see the cover story. They learn that Dupont is an employee. They can see both
salaries 1500 and 2000 but they know that 1500 is a lie.
3.4.4. Avoiding Cover Stories
Let us consider theorem (15) again. It says that a subject who is permitted to observe the existence
of an employee must be provided with a value for the salary of this employee.
Let us consider now the following database and let us assume that (17) is an integrity constraint.
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,S )
As seen in section 3.4.1, a value for the salary of Dupont must be provided at the unclassified
level in order to avoid a signalling channel, for instance:
Salaryc(Dupont,1500,U)
However, this corresponds to inserting a lie in the database. The security administrator may
consider that inserting a lie is not compatible with the database integrity. In this case, the security
administrator has three solutions:
1. Leave the situation as such, that is, accept the theorem (15) to be violated. This solution is not
very satisfactory, since a signalling channel is left open. A malicious user can use this channel
to build a bad covert channel, which provides unclassified users with high-classified
information they are not permitted to know. Therefore, we will not consider this solution in the
remainder of this paper.
2. A second solution to prevent the insertion of cover stories into Salaryc is to state that the
security level protecting the salary of an employee must be equal to the security level protecting
the existence of the employee himself:
∀x∀y∀l∀ ′ l ,Salaryc (x, y, l) ∧ Employeec(x, ′ l ) → l = ′ l 
Thanks to this axiom, users who are permitted to observe an employee classified at level l are
prevented to insert a salary value for this employee, at a level strictly dominating l.
This solution reduces considerably the expressive power of the multilevel security policy.
However, it can be used for some particular predicates (cf. for example the predicate Typec in
section 6.4).
3. Another possible solution to prevent the insertion of a cover story was first suggested by
[SJ92]. It consists in using a special symbol denoted by Restricted. Intuitively, Restricted
means that the value exists but is higher classified. This is captured in the following sentence:
∀x∀l,Salaryc(x, Restricted, l) → ∃y∃ ′ l ,Salaryc(x,y, ′ l ) ∧ y ≠ Restricted∧ l < ′ l 
Notice that this logical sentence represents the first attempt ever made to formally define the
semantics of this special value Restricted.
However, we cannot satisfy theorem (15) by inserting Salaryc(Dupont,Restricted,U) in the
multilevel database. Indeed, inserting Salary
c
(Dupont ,Restricted,U)  in the database cannot be
16
done without inserting Salary
cs
(Dupont, Restricted,S )(otherwise (17) is violated) which
sounds contradictory since Restricted is the opposite of a cover story. Therefore, in this
particular case, Salary
c
(Dupont ,Restricted,U)  must not be seen as an atomic fact of the
multilevel database but as a notation for the following sentence:
∃y∃l,Salaryc (Dupont ,y,l) ∧ y ≠ Restricted∧ U < l
which means “there exists a salary value for Dupont but you are not permitted to learn it”. Such
a sentence is classified at the level where the Restricted value should be inserted. In our
example, the above sentence is unclassified.
Notice that this solution does not prevent theorem (15) to be violated. Its main advantage over
solution 1 is that the special Restricted value (that is, the sentence
∃y∃l,Salaryc (Dupont ,y,l) ∧ y ≠ Restricted∧ U < l ) explicitly tells the unclassified users that
“there exists a salary value for Dupont but you are not permitted to learn it”. Therefore the
situation is no longer ambiguous and is consistent with the security administrator policy. In
particular, it is no longer possible for a malicious user to build a covert channel.
3.4.5. Comparison with Polyinstantiation
In the literature, the technique of polyinstantiation is generally used to manage cover stories.
However, we claim that this technique is unclear and leads to some ambiguities in the
interpretation of data. Let us describe some problems that are related to the technique of
polyinstantiation:
1. Ambiguous interpretation of data
Consider the following two examples:
Example a:
Let us assume that we have the following set of security levels:
{U, S}
Consider the following database:
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,S )
As shown in section 3.4.1, a value for Dupont’s salary must also be provided at the unclassified
level in order to avoid a signalling channel, for instance:
Salaryc(Dupont,1500,U)
The value of Dupont’s salary becomes then a polyinstantiated set of two classified values
{(2000,S),(1500,U)}. In the literature, the interpretation that is generally made about these values
is that 2000 is Dupont’s correct salary and 1500 is a cover story that unclassified users are
provided with. However, as shown in section 3.4.1, this interpretation implicitly assumes that (17)
is an integrity constraint. Indeed if (17) is not an integrity constraint then there is another possible
interpretation (cf. section 3.4.1): Dupont has two salaries, one secret 2000 and one unclassified
1500. If (17) is not an integrity constraint, then the technique of polyinstantiation does not provide
us with any means to know without any ambiguities which of the two possible interpretations is the
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correct one. On the contrary, with the technique presented in section 3.4.3 we know that if
Salarycs(Dupont,1500,S) belongs to the database then 1500 is a cover story otherwise it is
Dupont’s second salary.
Example b:
In this example, we assume we have the following set of security levels:
{U, C1, C2, S}
The following partial order is defined in this set:
C1 > U, C2 > U, S > C1, S > C2 and C1 <> C2
Let us also assume that (17) is an integrity constraint.
Consider the following database:
Employee
c
(Dupont,C1) ∧ Employee
c
(Dupont,C2 )
∧Salaryc(Dupont,2000,C1 ) ∧ Salary
c (Dupont,1500,C2 )
Dupont’s salary is a polyinstantiated set of two classified values {(2000, C1),(1500, C2)}.
With the polyinstantiation technique;
• if (17) is not an integrity constraint then a secret user cannot interpret these two values. He has
no means to determine whether 2000 and 1500 are two distinct salaries for Dupont or whether
one of these two values is a cover story.
• if (17) is an integrity constraint then the only thing a secret user can learn is that one of these
two values is a cover story, but this secret user is unable to say which one.
On the contrary, with the technique presented in section 3.4.3 we know that if
Salarycs(Dupont,1500,S) belongs to the database then 1500 is a cover story otherwise it is
Dupont’s second salary.
2. Poor expressive power
The technique of polyinstantiation allows us to introduce a lie in a predicate that describes an
entity attribute, but it does not provide us with any solution to introduce a cover story in a
predicate that describes an entity itself. For example, with the polyinstantiation technique, it is
possible to introduce a cover story in Salaryc (this predicate describes the salary attribute of the
employee entity) but it is not possible to introduce a lie in Employeec (this predicate describes the
employee entity). As a matter of fact, introducing a lie saying that Durand is an employee is
impossible with the polyinstantiation technique. With the new technique we propose, we show in
section 3.4.3 how we can easily do this.
3. Entity polyinstantiation
[Lun91] describes this type of polyinstantiation in the context of relational databases. In this
context, entity polyinstantiation occurs when a relation contains multiple tuples with the same
apparent primary key values, but having different classifications for this apparent primary key.
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In this paper, If we adapt this definition to our logical representation of a multilevel database then
we might obtain the following:
There is entity polyinstantiation when an atomic fact is associated with at least two comparable
security levels, that is, each time axiom (12) is violated.
Example
Let us assume we have the following database
Employee
c
(Dupont,U ) ∧ Employee
c
(Dupont, S)
Lunt [Lun91] suggests the following interpretation: there exist two distinct “Dupont” in the external
world, one whose existence is secret and one whose existence is unclassified. We reject this
interpretation since it makes the interpretation of other data more difficult. For instance, let us
assume that Salaryc(Dupont,2000,S) belongs to the multilevel database. Shall we consider that this
is the salary of “Dupont unclassified” or the salary of “Dupont secret” ?
We claim that if there exist two distinct “Dupont” in the external world, then they must be
distinguished by their name. For instance we may give the name Dupont_U to “Dupont
unclassified” and the name Dupont_S to “Dupont secret”4. Our database becomes then as follows:
Employee
c
(Dupont _U,U ) ∧ Employee
c
(Dupont _ S,S )
which is compatible with axiom (12).
Nevertheless, recall that axiom (12) implicitly states that it is possible to have a same atomic fact
associated with more than one security level, provided these security levels cannot be compared
between each other.
Example:
In this example, let us assume we have the following set of security levels.
{U, C1, C2, S} with the following partial order defined in it:
C1 > U, C2 > U, S > C1, S > C2 and C1 <> C2
Let us assume we have the following database:
Employee
c
(Dupont,C
1
) ∧ Employee
c
(Dupont ,C
2
)
We claim that this situation has nothing to do with “entity polyinstantiation”. Our interpretation of
this is that the fact “Dupont is an employee” is classified at two incomparable security levels C1
and C2.
                                                            
4
 In [SJ93], Sandhu and Jajodia suggest to cope with this problem of “entity polyinstantiation” by inserting in the database expressions
like Salary(Dupont,S,2500,S) and Salary(Dupont,U,2000,S). Salary(Dupont,S,2500,S) represents the (secret) salary of  “Dupont
secret” whereas Salary(Dupont,U,2000,S) represents the (secret) salary of  “Dupont unclassified”. However this technique
creates an ambiguity: security levels are sometimes used to identify the sensitivity of data (eg. S in Salary(Dupont,U,2000,S)) and
sometimes used to identify entities (eg. U in Salary(Dupont,U,2000,S)).
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4. MultiView database
The logical representation of a multilevel database given in section 3 is a complete one. This
logical representation provides us with a multilevel policy offering a great expressive power. It
allows us to manage fine classification grains and cover stories. This logical approach can be used
to model any kind of multilevel databases, such as multilevel relational databases and, as we will
see in section 6 and 7, multilevel object-oriented databases. This logical approach defines
precisely the concept of “classified data” by providing a clear semantics for each association
between a grain of classification and a security level. This logical approach also precisely defines
the concept of cover story without using the confusing technique of polyinstantiation.
However, this formalization of a multilevel database does not clearly indicate what part of the
multilevel database a user cleared at level l can see. The purpose of this section is to refine this
logical representation in order to clearly and formally define what is the part of the multilevel
database that each user is supposed to observe5.
Intuitively, we decompose a n-level logical database into n views. The whole multilevel database
is then seen as a collection of views. We call this set of views MultiView Database.
Schematically, each view is associated with a given level of classification and contains a
consistent and complete set of data whose classifications are lower than or equal to the level of the
view. A user cleared at level l can then observe every view whose security level is dominated by
l.
In section 8, we shall describe the implementation of a MultiView database for the particular case
of an object-oriented database.
4.1. Language
 The language Lv which is used to represent a MultiView Database is an extension of the language
Lcs developed in section 3.4.3. For each n+1-place predicate Pc, there is a n+1-place predicate Pv.
Predicates Pv are used to represent the MultiView database content. Intuitively, if l is a
classification level, then Pv(t1, …, tn,l) reads “the piece of information P(t1,…, tn) belongs to the
view classified at level l”6.
Example:
Employeev(Dupont,U)
(that reads “the fact that Dupont is an employee belongs to the unclassified view”)
Employeev(Dupont,S)
(that reads “the fact that Dupont is an employee belongs to the secret view”)
4.2. Axiomatic
The axiomatic Av of the theory Tv includes the following axioms:
                                                            
5
 The approach presented in this section matches with the “Trusted approach” suggested in [Cup96].
6
 Notice the difference of interpretation between P
c
(t1, …, tn, l) and P
v
(t1, …, tn, l). P
c
(t1, …, tn, l) means “the piece of information
P(t1,…, tn) is classified at level l whereas P
v
(t1, …, tn, l) reads “the piece of information P(t1,…, tn) belongs to the view classified
at level l”.
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1. All axioms Acs of theory Tcs (cf. section 3.4.3) + Rule 1 + Rule 2 + Rule 3.
2. A set of atomic facts that represents the MultiView database content:
Example:
Employeev(Dupont,U), Employeev(Dupont,S) …
3. A set of axioms which is used to specify the links between the multilevel database and the
MultiView database:
For each Honest predicate Pc, we have the following axiom:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l∀ ′ l , P
c
(t1,K,tn , l) ∧ l ≤ ′ l → P
v
(t1,K, tn , ′ l ) (21)
This axiom says that a fact classified at level l belongs to every view whose associated security
level dominates l.
For each Liar predicate Pc, we have the following two axioms:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
c
(t1,K, tn , l) → P
v
(t1,K, tn , l) (22)
This axiom says that a fact classified at level l belongs to the view of level l. However, since
this fact belongs to a Liar predicate it might be a cover story, therefore we cannot be sure that it
also belongs to the views of level strictly dominating l. This is captured by axiom (23):
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l∀ ′ l , P
v
(t1,K,tn ,l) ∧ Justbelow(l, l' ) ∧ ¬P
cs
(t1,K,tn, ′ l ) → P
v
(t1,K,tn, ′ l ) (23)
where Justbelow is defined as follows:
∀l∀ ′ l , Justbelow(l, ′ l ) ↔ l < ′ l ∧ ¬(∃ ′ ′ l ,l < ′ ′ l ∧ ′ ′ l < ′ l )
Axiom (23) says that if a fact belongs to a view of level l and if this fact is not referred as a
cover story in a level l’ such as l is just below l’, then this fact also belongs to the view of level
l’. Notice that axiom (23) can be rewritten as follows:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l∀ ′ l , P
v
(t1,K,tn ,l) ∧ Justbelow(l, l' ) ∧ ¬P
v
(t1,K, tn , ′ l ) → P
cs
(t1,K,tn, ′ l ) (23bis)
It says that if a fact belongs to a view at level l and if there is a level l’ such as l is just below l’
and this fact does not belong to the view at level l’, then this fact is a cover story of level l’.
Finally, the following axiom applies to both Liar and Honest predicates:
  
∀t1K∀tn∀l, P
v
(t1,K,tn ,l) ∧ (∀ ′ l ,Justbelow(l' , l) → ¬P
v
( t1,K,tn, ′ l )) → P
c
(t1,K, tn , l) (24)
This axiom says that if a fact belongs to the view at level l and if this fact does not belong to
any view classified with a level just below the level l, then this fact is classified at level l in
the multilevel database. Note that this axiom is still valid if l = Low.
Note also that axioms (21) to (24) establish a one to one correspondence between a MultiView
database and a multilevel database:
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• If we make the Closed World Assumption (CWA)  [Rei78,Rei83] on the extensions of the Pv
predicates7, then from the facts belonging to the Pv predicates we can derive the facts belonging
to the Pc and Pcs predicates, using axioms (23b) and (24).
• If we make the CWA on the extensions of the Pcs predicates8, then from the facts belonging to the
Pc and Pcs predicates we can derive the facts belonging to the Pv predicates, using axioms (21),
(22) and (23).
 Example:
 In this example, we assume that we have the following set of security levels:
 {U, C1, C2, S}
 The following partial order is defined in it:
 C1 > U, C2 > U, S > C1, S > C2 and C1 <> C2
 Consider the following multilevel database content:
 
Employeec (Dupont,C1) ∧ Employee
c(Dupont,C2 )
∧Salary
c
(Dupont,2000,C1 ) ∧ Salary
c
(Dupont,1500,C2 )
∧Salarycs (Dupont,1500,S )
 Consider the following MultiView database content:
 
Employee
v
(Dupont,C1) ∧ Employee
v
(Dupont,C2 ) ∧ Employee
v
(Dupont,S)
∧Salaryv(Dupont,2000,C1 ) ∧ Salary
v(Dupont,1500,C2 ) ∧ Salary
v (Dupont,2000,S)
 Let us show that the MultiView database can be derived from the multilevel database:
• From Employeec(Dupont,C1) and (21) we can derive Employee
v(Dupont,C1) and
Employeev(Dupont, S)
• From Employeec(Dupont,C2) and (21) we can derive Employee
v(Dupont,C2)
• From Salaryc(Dupont,1500,C1) and (22) we can derive Salary
v(Dupont,1500,C1)
• From Salaryc(Dupont,2000,C2) and (22) we can derive Salary
v(Dupont,2000,C2)
• From Salaryc(Dupont,2000,C2), ¬Salary
cs(Dupont,2000,S) (derived from the CWA made on the
Pcs predicates) and (23) then we can derive Salaryv(Dupont,2000,S)
 Let us now show that the multilevel database can be derived from the MultiView database:
• From Employeev(Dupont,C1) and (24) we can derive Employee
c(Dupont,C1)
• From Employeev(Dupont,C2) and (24) we can derive Employee
c(Dupont,C2)
                                                            
7
 For each predicate P
v
 of arity n+1, if P
v
(t1,t2 , …,tn,l) is not derivable from the theory T
v
, then we shall assume that
¬P
v
(t1,t2,…,tn,l) is  derivable from T
v
.
 
8
 For each predicate P
cs
 of arity n+1, if P
cs
(t1,t2 , …,tn,l) is not derivable from the theory T
v
, then we shall assume that
¬P
cs
(t1,t2,…,tn,l) is  derivable from T
v
.
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• From Salaryv(Dupont,1500,C1) and (24) we can derive Salary
c(Dupont,1500,C1)
• From Salaryv(Dupont,2000,C2) and (24) we can derive Salary
c(Dupont,2000,C2)
• From Salaryv(Dupont,1500,C1), ¬Salary
v(Dupont,1500,S) (derived from the CWA made on the
Pv predicates) and (23b) then we can derive Salarycs(Dupont,1500,S)
5. Non-protected object-oriented database
First-order logic has been largely used to formalize relational databases. In the context of object-
oriented databases, it is less obvious to use first-order logic as a formal language. It seems that
several concepts such as methods require higher order logics or modal logics (dynamic logic for
instance) to be properly formalized [Wie91]. However, our goal is not to develop such a complete
formalism. We simply need to formally represent the main object-oriented concepts in order to
apply the classification process (see section 6 below).
Using the approach presented in section 2, we propose a list of nine predicates allowing us to
represent the content of any object-oriented database. Then, we introduce a list of integrity
constraints inherent to the object paradigm. These integrity constraints must be respected in any
object-oriented database.
5.1. Language
The language L of the theory T contains nine predicates that allow us to represent the content of any
object-oriented database:
• Two one place predicates Object and Class.
• Five two place predicates CA, OA, Method, Instance and Isa.
• Two three place predicates Val and Type.
 Intuitively, these predicates must be interpreted as follows:
• Object(o): “o is an object”.
• Class(c): “c is a class”.
• CA(c,a): “a is an attribute of class c”.
• OA(o,a): “a is an attribute of object o”.
• Method(c,m): “m is a method of class c”.
• Instance(o,c): “o is an instance of class c”.
• Isa(c,c’): “c is a subclass of c’ ”.
• Val(o,a,v): “v is the value of attribute a in object o”.
• Type(c,a,t): “t is the type of attribute a in class c”.
5.2. Axiomatic
As defined in section 2.2, the axiomatic A of the theory T contains the following axioms:
1. A set DB of atomic facts that represents the object-oriented database content.
Example:
Class(Supersonic_Aircraft)
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(that reads “Supersonic_Aircraft is a class”)
Object(FireFox)
(that reads “FireFox is an object”)
CA(Supersonic_Aircraft,Speed)
(that reads “Speed is an attribute of Supersonic_Aircraft”)
Instance(FireFox,Supersonic_Aircraft)
(that reads “FireFox is an instance of Supersonic_Aircraft”)
Val(FireFox,Speed,mach 6)
(that reads “mach 6 is the value of the Speed of FireFox”)
2. A set IC of basic integrity constraints (cf. Frame 1) that are inherent to the object paradigm
and that must be consistent with the database content. From a theoretical point of view, this set
∀a∀c,CA(c, a) → Class(c) (25) ∀a∀o, OA(o,a ) → Object(o ) (26)
∀m∀c, Method(c, m) → Class(c) (27) ∀a∀o, OA(o,a ) ↔ ∃v ,Val(o, a, v) (28)
∀a∀c,CA(c, a) ↔ ∃t, Type( c,a , t) (29) ∀o∀c, Instance( o, c) → Object( o) ∧ Class(c) (30)
∀c∀ ′ c , Isa(c, ′ c ) → Class( c) ∧ Class( ′ c ) (31) ∀c∀ ′ c ∀ ′ ′ c , Isa(c, ′ c ) ∧ Isa( ′ c , ′ ′ c ) → Isa(c, ′ ′ c ) (32)
∀c∀ ′ c ∀a, Isa(c , ′ c ) ∧ CA( ′ c ,a) → CA( c,a ) (33) ∀c∀ ′ c ∀m, Isa( c, ′ c ) ∧ Method( ′ c ,m) → Method(c, m) (34)
∀o∀a, OA(o,a ) ↔ ∃c,CA(c, a ) ∧ Instance( o, c) (35) ∀c∀ ′ c ∀o, Instance(o, c) ∧ Isa(c, ′ c ) → Instance( o, ′ c ) (36)
∀o, Object(o) → ∃c, Instance(o,c) (37)
∀c∀o∀a∀v∀t, Val(o,a,v ) ∧ Instance( o, c) ∧ Type(c,a, t) ∧ Class( t) → Instance(v, t) (38)
(25) says that if a is an attribute of c then c is a class.
(26) says that if a is an attribute of o then o is an object.
(27) says that if m is a method of c then c is a class.
(28) says that if a is an attribute of object o, then there exists a value v for this attribute. Conversely it says that if
v is the value of a in (object) o then a is an attribute of o.
(29) says that if a is an attribute of class c, then there exists a type t for this attribute. Conversely it says that if t
is the type of a in c then a is an attribute of c.
(30) says that if o is an instance of c then o is an object and c is a class.
(31) says that if c is a subclass of c’ then c and c’ are classes.
(32) says that if c is a subclass of c’ and c’ is a subclass of c’’ then c is a subclass of c’’ (transitivity of Isa).
(33) says that if a is an attribute of c’ and c is a subclass of c’ then a is also an attribute of c (inheritance property
1).
(34) says that if m is a method of c’ and c is a subclass of c’ then m is also a method of c (inheritance property 2).
(35) says that if a is an attribute of o then there exists a class c such as o is an instance of c. Conversely, if a is an
attribute of c and o is an instance of c then a is an attribute of o (inheritance property 3).
(36) says that if o is an instance of c and c is a subclass of c’ then o is an instance of c’.
(37) says that if o is an object then there exists a class c such as o is an instance of c.
(38) says that if o is an instance of c and a is an attribute of c and the type of a is class t then the value of a in o
must be an instance of t.
Frame 1. Integrity constraints of an object-oriented database
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of integrity constraints must be derivable from the set of atomic facts that make up the database
content ( DB − IC).
Integrity constraints (25) to (38) are all integrity constraints of Type 1 or Type 2 (see
section 2.2). Note however that integrity constraint (28) stands for two integrity constraints:
∀a∀o,OA(o,a) → ∃v,Val(o,a,v) which is of Type 2
∀a∀o∀v,Val(o,a,v) → OA(o, a) which is of Type 1
Same particularity appears with integrity constraints (29) and (35).
Notice also that integrity constraint (30) stands for two integrity constraints of Type 1:
∀o∀c, Instance(o,c) → Object(o)
∀o∀c, Instance(o,c) → Class(c)
Same particularity happens with integrity constraint (31).
Finally notice that we present the concept of method using a very simple syntactical definition.
This definition will allow us to include in our model the possibility to classify the existence of
methods. In [CG97], we also include the possibility to protect the program associated with a
method. For the sake of simplicity, we prefer to omit this possibility here.
5.3. Example of a non-protected object-oriented database
Instead of giving a long list of atomic facts, we represent our example of a non-protected object-
oriented database using a figure (cf. figure 2). One can check that this non-protected object-
oriented database respects integrity constraints (25) to (38).
In this example class Hypersonic_Aircraft is a subclass of class Supersonic_Aircraft. Object
Mirage is an instance of class Supersonic_Aircraft whereas object FireFox is an instance of class
Hypersonic _Aircraft and consequently (cf. axiom (36)) of class Supersonic_Aircraft.
   SUPERSONIC_AIRCRAFT
Attributes  
Speed : integer
Range : integer
Weapons : set of string
Nuclear_Bomb : boolean
Methods  
Automatic_Pilot
Drop_Nuclear_Bomb
Isa
   HYPERSONIC_AIRCRAFT
Attributes  
Speed : integer
Range : integer
Weapons : set of string
Nuclear_Bomb : boolean
Boosters : integer
Methods  
Automatic_Pilot
25
Figure 2: Example of an object-oriented database
6. Multilevel object-oriented database
In this section, we define a model for a multilevel object-oriented database. We previously called
this model, the Single-View model  [CG96a]. In this model, all the information related to a real-
world entity is encapsulated in a single multilevel object.
6.1. Language
As defined in section 3.1 and section 3.4.3, the language L is extended to the language Lcs as
follows:
• For each predicate P of arity n, there is a predicate Pc of arity (n+1). Therefore, we obtain nine
multilevel predicates Objectc, Classc, CAc, OAc, Isac, Instancec, Methodc, Valc and Typec.
• For each Liar predicate Pc of arity n+1, there is a predicate Pcs of arity n+1. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume in this paper that only Valc is a Liar predicate (having other Liar
predicates would not create any problem). Therefore, Valcs is included in Lcs.
6.2. Axiomatic
As defined in section 3.2 and 3.4.3, the axiomatic Acs of the theory Tcs includes the following
axioms:
1. Axioms from A (cf. section 5.2)
2. Axioms (5) to (12) + Rule 1 + Rule 2
3. Axiom (16) for all Honest predicates (that is, all of them except Valc).
4. Axiom (18) to (20) for all Liar predicates (that is, only Valc).
5. Rule 3
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6. A set of atomic facts that represents the multilevel object-oriented database content.
Example:
Classc(Hypersonic_Aircraft,C)
(that reads “the fact that Hypersonic_Aircraft is a class is confidential”)
Objectc(FireFox,U)
(that reads “the fact that FireFox is an object is unclassified”)
Instancec(FireFox, Hypersonic_Aircraft,S)
(that reads “the fact that FireFox is an instance of Hypersonic_Aircraft is secret”)
Valc(FireFox,Speed,mach 6,S)
(that reads “the fact that mach 6 is the value of the Speed of FireFox is secret”)
Valc(FireFox,Speed,mach 2,U)
(that reads “the fact that mach 2 is the value of the Speed of FireFox is unclassified”)
7. A set of atomic facts that represents the cover stories.
Example:
Valcs(FireFox,Speed,mach 2,S)
(that reads “the fact that Val(FireFox,Speed,mach 2) is a cover story is secret”)
6.3. Inference channels control theorems
Our objective in this section is to derive general constraints that must be enforced when classifying
the object-oriented database content. As explained in section 3.3, we must apply deductive
channels control Rule 1 or signalling channels control Rule 2 to each of the integrity constraints
from (25) through (38). If the integrity constraint is of Type 1 then we must apply Rule 1, if it is of
Type 2 then we must apply Rule 2. We then obtain a list of deductive channels control theorems
and a list of signalling channels control theorems. Notice that Olivier and Solms [OS94] have
already proposed a less complete list of such theorems.
6.3.1. Deductive channels control theorems
Deductive channels control theorems (cf. Frame 2) are derived by applying Rule 1 on integrity
constraints (25) to (38) that are of Type 1. Recall that each of the integrity constraints (28), (29)
and (35) actually stands for two integrity constraints, one of Type 1 and one of Type 2. Recall also
that each of the integrity constraints (30) and (31) stands for two integrity constraints of Type 1
(see section 6.2).
Some of these theorems contradict some rules enounced in other security models. For example,
theorem (44) says that if the fact “o is an instance of class c” is classified at level l then there must
exist a level l’ and a level l’’, both dominated by l, which respectively protect the facts “o is an
object” and “c is a class”. Some authors [Lun90,JK90,ML92] pretend that the security level
protecting an objet o must dominate the security level protecting the class c which o is an instance
of. This theorem (44), formally derived and proved, shows that this does have to be the case (see
section 6.4 for a practical counter-example).
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Notice that theorem (51) precisely enounces the constraint that must be enforced when assigning a
security level to an attribute value that is itself an object.
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Frame 2. Deductive channels control theorems for a multilevel object-oriented database
                                                            
9
 As already mentioned, (28) stands for two integrity constraints, one of type 1 and one of type 2 (cf section 5.2). (42) is actually
obtained by applying Rule 1 on the integrity constraint of type 1. Similar comment can be made for (43) and (49).
10
 As already mentioned, (30) stands for two integrity constraints of type 1 (cf section 5.2). (44) is actually obtained by successively
applying Rule 1 on these two integrity constraints and then by combining the two resulting theorems. Similar comment can be made
for (45).
∀a∀c∀l,CA
c
(c, a, l) → ∃ ′ l , Class
c
(c, ′ l ) ∧ ′ l ≤ l (39) ∀a∀o∀l, OA
c
(o ,a,l) ∧ → ∃ ′ l ,Object
c
(o, ′ l ) ∧ ′ l ≤ l (40)
∀m∀c∀l, Methodc (c, m, l) → ∃ ′ l , Classc (c, ′ l ) ∧ ′ l ≤ l (41) ∀a∀o∀v∀ l,Valc (o,a, v,l ) → ∃ ′ l ,OAc (o ,a, ′ l ) ∧ ′ l ≤ l (42)
∀a∀c∀t∀l,Type
c
(c, a, t,l) → ∃ ′ l ,CA
c
( c, a, ′ l ) ∧ ′ l ≤ l (43)
∀o∀c∀l, Instancec( o, c,l) → ∃ ′ l ∃ ′ ′ l ,Objectc( o, ′ l ) ∧ Classc (c, ′ ′ l ) ∧ lub( ′ l , ′ ′ l ) ≤ l (44)
∀c∀ ′ c ∀l, Isac (c , ′ c ,l ) → ∃ ′ l ∃ ′ ′ l ,Classc ( c, ′ l ) ∧ Classc ( ′ c , ′ l ) ∧ lub( ′ l , ′ ′ l ) ≤ l (45)
∀c∀ ′ c ∀ ′ ′ c ∀l∀ ′ l , Isa
c
(c, ′ c ,l) ∧ Isa
c
( ′ c , ′ ′ c , ′ l ) → ∃ ′ ′ l , Isa
c
(c, ′ ′ c , ′ ′ l ) ∧ ′ ′ l ≤ lub( l, ′ l ) (46)
∀c∀ ′ c ∀a∀l∀ ′ l , Isac (c, ′ c ,l) ∧ CAc ( ′ c , a, ′ l ) → ∃ ′ ′ l ,CAc (c, a, ′ ′ l ) ∧ ′ ′ l ≤ lub( l, ′ l ) (47)
∀c∀ ′ c ∀m∀l∀ ′ l , Isa
c
(c, ′ c ,l) ∧ Method
c
( ′ c , m , ′ l ) → ∃ ′ l , Method
c
(c, m , ′ ′ l ) ∧ ′ ′ l ≤ lub( l, ′ l ) (48)
∀o∀a∀c∀ l∀ ′ l , CAc( c,a, l) ∧ Instancec (o ,c, ′ l ) → ∃ ′ l ,OA c (o, a, ′ ′ l ) ∧ ′ ′ l ≤ lub( l, ′ l ) (49)
∀c∀ ′ c ∀o∀l∀ ′ l , Isac (c, ′ c ,l) ∧ Instancec ( o, c, ′ l ) → ∃ ′ ′ l , Instancec (o , ′ c , ′ ′ l ) ∧ ′ ′ l ≤ lub( l, ′ l ) (50)
∀c∀o∀a∀v∀t∀l1∀l2 ∀l3∀ l4 ,Val
c
(o , a, v,l1 ) ∧ Instance
c
(o,c ,l2 ) ∧ Type
c
( c,a , t, l3 ) ∧ Class
c
( t,l4 )
→ ∃l5, Instance
c
(v, t,l5) ∧ l5 ≤ lub(l1, l2 , l3, l4 )
(51)
(39) says that if the fact “a is an attribute of class c” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ dominated by l that protects the fact “c is a class”.
(Combine Rule 1 with axiom (25))
(40) says that if the fact “a is an attribute of object o” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ dominated by l that protects the fact “o is an
object”. (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (26))
(41) says that if the fact “m is a method of class c” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ dominated by l that protects the fact “c is a class”.
(Combine Rule 1 with axiom (27))
(42) says that if the fact “v is the value of the attribute a in object o” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ dominated by l that protects the
fact “a is an attribute of object o”. (Combine
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 Rule 1 with axiom (28))
(43) says that if the fact “t is the type of the attribute a in class c” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ dominated by l that protects the fact
“a is an attribute of class c”. (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (29))
(44) says that if the fact “o is an instance of class c” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ and a level l’’ both dominated by l and
respectively protecting the facts “o is an object” and “c is a class”. (Combine
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 Rule 1 with axiom (30)).
(45) says that if the fact “c is a subclass of class c’ ” is classified at level l then there must exist a level l’ and a level l’’ both dominated by l and
respectively protecting the facts “c is a class” and “c’ is a class”. (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (31))
(46) says that if the fact “c is a subclass of class c’ ” is classified at level l and if the fact “c’ is a subclass of c’’ ” is classified at level l’ then there must
exist a level l’’ dominated by the least upper bound of l and l’ that protects the fact “c is a subclass of class c’’ ” (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (32))
(47) says that if the fact “c is a subclass of class c’ ” is classified at level l and if the fact “a is an attribute of c’ ” is classified at level l’ then there must exist
a level l’’ dominated by the least upper bound of l and l’ that protects the fact “a is an attribute of class c” (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (33))
(48) says that if the fact “c is a subclass of class c’ ” is classified at level l and if the fact “m is a method of c’ ” is classified at level l’ then there must exist a
level l’’ dominated by the least upper bound of l and l’ that protects the fact “m is a method of class c” (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (34))
(49) says that if the fact “a is an attribute of c” is classified at level l and if the fact “o is an instance of class c” is classified at level l’ then there must exist a
level l’’ dominated by the least upper bound of l and l’ that protects the fact “a is an attribute of object o” (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (35))
(50) says that if the fact “c is a subclass of c’ ” is classified at level l and if the fact “o is an instance of c” is classified at level l’ then there must exist a level
l’’ dominated by the least upper bound of l and l’ that protects the fact “o is an instance of class c’ ” (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (36))
(51) says that if the fact “t is a class” is classified at level l4, if the fact “t is the type of attribute a in class c” is classified at level l3, if the fact “o is an
instance of class c” is classified at level l2 and if the fact “v is the value of attribute a in object o” is classified at level l1 then there must exist a level l5
dominated by the least upper bound of l1, l2, l3 and l4 that protects the fact “v is an instance of t” (Combine Rule 1 with axiom (38))
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6.3.2. Signalling channels control theorems
Signalling channels control theorems (cf. Frame 3) are derived by applying Rule 2 on integrity
constraints from (25) through (38) which are of Type 2. Recall that each of the integrity constraints
(28), (29) and (35) actually stands for two integrity constraints, one of Type 1 and one of Type 2
(see section 6.2).
6.4. Example of a multilevel object-oriented database
Figure 3 presents a multilevel database derived from the non-protected object-oriented database
represented in figure 2. This multilevel database is consistent with theorems (39)-(56). We appeal
the reader’s attention to the following points:
• There are three security levels U = Low (Unclassified), C (Confidential) and S = High (Secret)
with U < C < S.
• Unclassified information is in regular font, confidential information is in italic and secret
information is in bold.
• The existence of class Hypersonic_Aircraft is confidential.
• The existence of attribute Nuclear_Bomb is secret in every class.
• The existence of both objects Mirage and FireFox is unclassified.
∀a∀o∀l, OA
c
(o ,a,l) → ∃v∃ ′ l , Val
c
(o,a ,v , ′ l ) ∧ ( ′ l ≤ l) (52) ∀a∀o∀l, OA
c
(o ,a,l) → ∃v,Val
c
(o, a, v, l) (53)
∀a∀c∀l,CAc (c, a, l) → ∃t, Typec( c, a, t,l) (54) ∀o∀ l, Objectc (o, l) → ∃c, Instancec (o,c, l) (55)
∀o∀a∀l, OAc (o ,a,l) → ∃c∃ ′ l ∃ ′ ′ l ,CAc (c, a, ′ l ) ∧ Instancec (o ,c, ′ ′ l ) ∧ l = lub( ′ l , ′ ′ l ) (56)
(52) says that if the classification of the fact “a is attribute of object o” is classified at level l then there must
exist a value v for this object attribute whose classification level l’ is dominated by l. (Combine Rule 2 with
axiom (28))
(53) says that if the classification of the fact “a is attribute of object o” is classified at level l then there must
exist a value v for this object attribute whose classification level is l. This theorem is obtained by combining
the theorem (52) with theorem (42). The proof is similar to the proof made for (15)
 (54) says that if the classification of the fact “a is attribute of class c” is classified at level l then there must exist
a type t for this class attribute whose classification level is l. Applying Rule 2 onto axiom (29) and then
combining the result with theorem (43) gives this theorem. The proof is similar to the proof made for (15).
(55) says that if the classification of the fact “o is an object” is classified at level l then there must exist a class c
which o is an instance of and such as the instance link between o and c is equal to l. Applying Rule 2 onto
axiom (37) and then combining the result with theorem (44) gives this theorem. The proof is similar to the
proof made for (15).
(56) says that if the classification of the fact “a is attribute of object o” is classified at level l then there must
exist a class c such that “o is an instance of c” and “a is attribute of c” are two existing facts respectively
classified at level l’ and l’’ such as l=lub(l’,l’’). Applying Rule 2 onto axiom (35) and then combining the
result with theorem (49) gives this theorem. The proof is similar to the proof made for (15).
Frame 3. Signalling channels control theorems for a multilevel object-oriented database
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• The fact that FireFox is an instance of class Hypersonic_Aircraft is secret, but the fact it is an
instance of Supersonic_Aircraft is unclassified. This is an illustration of theorem (44) and a
counter-example to a rule enounced by [Lun90,JK90,ML92]. This rule states that an object must
always be classified at a level dominating the security level assigned to the class, which this
object is an instance of.
 
  SUPERSONIC_AIRCRAFT(U)
Attributes  
Speed (U) : integer (U)
Range (U) : integer (U)
Weapons (U) : set of string (U)
Nuclear_Bomb (S) : boolean (S)
Methods  
Automatic_Pilot (U)
Drop_Nuclear_Bomb (S)
Isa (C)
   HYPERSONIC_AIRCRAFT (C)
Attributes  
Speed (C): integer (C)
Range (C) : integer (C)
Weapons (C) : set of string (C)
Nuclear_Bomb (S) : boolean (S)
Boosters (C) : integer (C)
Methods  
Automatic_Pilot (C)
Drop_Nuclear_Bomb (S)
   Mirage (U)
Speed (U) : mach 2.5 (U)
Range (U) : 1000 km (U)
Weapons (U): {{Gun, Bomb} (U)
{Gun, Bomb, Rocket} (S)}
Nuclear_ Bomb (S) : FALSE (S)
Instance (U)
   FireFox (U)
Speed (U) : {mach 2 (U), mach 6 (S)}
Range : {Restricted (U), 3000 km (C)}
Weapons (U): {Gun, Rocket, Bomb} (U)
Nuclear_ Bomb (S) : TRUE (S)
Boosters (S) : 2 (S)
Instance (U)
Instance (S)
 Figure 3: Example of a multilevel object-oriented database
• The secret value mach 6 is the actual Speed value of Firefox, whereas the unclassified value
mach 2 stands for a cover story. This means that Valcs(FireFox,Speed,mach 2,S) belongs to the
multilevel database.
• Attribute Weapons of Mirage is associated with a set of values: Gun and Bomb that are both
unclassified and Rocket that is secret. This means that Valc(Mirage,Weapon,Gun,U),
Valc(Mirage,Weapon,Bomb,U) and Valc(Mirage,Weapon,Rocket,S) belong to the multilevel
database.
• Attribute Range of FireFox is associated with the Restricted special value at the unclassified
level. This means that unclassified users are permitted to know that a higher classified value
exists for the Range attribute. Recall that from a theoretical point of view (cf. section 3.4.4) it
does not mean that Valc(FireFox,Range,Restricted,U) belongs to the database. This Restricted
value in figure 3 stands for the following unclassified sentence:
∃v∃l,Valc (Firefox, Range,v ,l) ∧ v ≠ Restricted∧ U < l .
As a consequence, theorem (53) is violated for this particular attribute value.
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• Solution 2 of section 3.4.4 is applied in order to avoid the insertion of cover stories concerning
the type of the attributes. In other words, we assume the following sentence to be an axiom:
 ∀a∀c∀t∀l∀ ′ l ,CAc (c,a,l) ∧ Typec (c,a, t, ′ l ) → l = ′ l 
 It also means that, in our particular example, we estimate that it is not necessary to classify a
class attribute and the type of this attribute independently from each other. However, in some
applications, being able to classify the type of an attribute and the attribute itself separately
could be a useful possibility.
 We also provide the following comments on figure 3:
• Every attribute and method of the confidential class Hypersonic_Aircraft is classified at the
confidential level or higher (theorems (39) and (41)).
• Inheritance link between class Hypersonic_Aircraft and Supersonic_Aircraft must be at least
confidential (theorem (45))
• Since the inheritance link between the classes Hypersonic_Aircraft and Supersonic_Aircraft is
confidential, the attributes Speed, Range and Weapons of class Hypersonic_Aircraft are
confidential (they cannot be secret) (theorem (47)).
• The existence of attribute Boosters is confidential in class Hypersonic_Aircraft but is secret in
object FireFox. This is due to theorem (56).
• For every attribute value different from Restricted, theorem (53) is satisfied.
• The instance links between Mirage and Supersonic_Aircraft and between FireFox and
Supersonic_Aircraft are unclassified. This is due to theorem (55).
7. MultiView object-oriented database
The Single-View model presented in the previous section is a complete model. However, as
suggested in section 4, we think that it is necessary to precisely define what part of the multilevel
database each user may observe. In this section, we shall apply the principle described in section
4 that is, we shall decompose a n-level object oriented database into n views. Recall that each
view is associated with its own security level and contains a complete and consistent set of data
whose classifications are lower than or equal to the level of the view. In section 8, we shall
investigate how to implement a MultiView object-oriented database. The technique we suggest
will allow us to avoid unnecessary replications.
7.1. Language
As defined in section 4.1, the language Lcs is extended into the language Lv as follows: for each
predicate Pc of arity n+1, there is a predicate Pv of arity (n+1). Therefore, we obtain nine
MultiView predicates Objectv, Classv, CAv, OAv, Isav, Instancev, Methodv, Valv and Typev.
7.2. Axiomatic
According to section 4.2, the axiomatic Av of the theory Tv includes the following axioms:
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1. Axioms from Acs (cf. section 6.2).
2. Axiom (21) for all Honest predicates
3. Axioms (22) and (23) for all Liar predicates (that is, only Valc)
4. Axiom (24)
5. A set of atomic facts that represents the MultiView object-oriented database
Example:
Classv(Supersonic_Aircraft,U)
(that reads “the fact that Supersonic_Aircraft is a class belongs to the unclassified view”)
Classv(Supersonic_Aircraft,C)
(that reads “the fact that Supersonic_Aircraft is a class belongs to the confidential view”)
Classv(Supersonic_Aircraft,S)
(that reads “the fact that Supersonic_Aircraft is a class belongs to the secret view”)
Valv(FireFox,Speed,mach 6,S)
(that reads “the fact that mach 6 is the value of the Speed of FireFox belongs to the secret
view”)
7.3. Example of a MultiView object-oriented database
Figure 4 presents a MultiView database derived from the multilevel object-oriented database
represented in figure 3. For a better reading of the figure, inherited attributes and methods of each
class view are not shown. We appeal the reader’s attention to the following points:
• Every information classified at level l that is not a cover story or the special Restricted value is
replicated at all levels dominating the level l (axiom (21)).
• Attribute values are derived from axiom (22) (for example value mach 2 in the unclassified
view or value mach 6 in the secret view) or from axiom (23) (for example value mach 2 in the
confidential view).
33
  Supersonic_Aircraft
    Attributes   
Speed  : integer
Range : integer
Weapons : set of string
Nuclear_Bomb: boolean
     Methods   
Automatic_Pilot
Drop_Nuclear_Bomb
Isa
   Hypersonic_Aircraft
    Attributes   
Boosters : integer
     Methods   
   Mirage
Speed : mach 2.5
Range : 1000 km
Weapons : {Gun, Bomb,
Rocket}
Nuclear_ Bomb: FALSE
Instance
 FireFox
Speed : mach 6
Range : 3000 km
Weapons : {Gun, Rocket,
Bomb}
Nuclear_ Bomb: TRUE
Boosters : 2
Instance
Instance
  Supersonic_Aircraft
    Attributes   
Speed  : integer
Range : integer
Weapons : set of string
     Methods  
Automatic_Pilot
Isa
   Hypersonic_Aircraft
    Attributes   
Boosters : integer
     Methods  
   Mirage
Speed : mach 2.5
Range : 1000 km
Weapons : {Gun, Bomb}
Instance
 FireFox
Speed : mach 2
Range : 3000 km
Weapons : {Gun, Rocket,
Bomb}
Instance
  Supersonic_Aircraft
    Attributes   
Speed  : integer
Range : integer
Weapons : set of string
     Methods   
Automatic_Pilot
   Mirage
Speed : mach 2.5
Range : 1000 km
Weapons : {Gun, Bomb}
Instance
 FireFox
Speed : mach 2
Range : Restricted
Weapons : {Gun, Rocket,
Bomb}
Instance
Secret View Confidential View Unclassified View
Figure 4: Example of a MultiView object-oriented database
8. Implementing a MultiView object-oriented database
We can choose to implement either the layer 2 or the layer 3 of our 3-layer model. Indeed, in
section 4, we showed that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between these two layers.
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If we choose to implement the layer 2 then we must build a mechanism, which provides a user with
a consistent view of the multilevel database. This view must be complete and compatible with the
user’s clearance level. In [BCGY94b], we propose a model (the Virtual View model)
implementing such a mechanism. Its principle is the following: a user of level l is provided with a
virtual view of level l derived from the multilevel database. This virtual view is consistent,
complete and compatible with the user’s clearance level. The main disadvantage of this approach
is that the mechanism that builds the virtual view must be trusted.
We claim that implementing the layer 3 is easier. Indeed, in the MultiView model, a user of level l
may directly observe all the views of level dominated by l (see [CG96b] for more details).
Therefore, access controls are easy to define and there is no need of a special intermediate trusted
mechanism between the user and the database. Thus, in this section, we propose some basic
principles to implement the layer 3 for the particular case of an object-oriented database.
8.1. Principles
In this section we propose a short sketch of implementation for a MultiView object-oriented
database. More precisely, we suggest some principles for implementing a MultiView object-
oriented database. However, we do not claim that these principles are complete. In particular, we
do not investigate the problem of updating a MultiView database. The reader can refer to [CG96a]
or [Gab95] for more explanations.
The principles we suggest for implementing a MultiView object-oriented database are the
following:
• Each view of level l is implemented as a single-level database of level l.
• In the MultiView model, a multilevel entity (object or class) is represented by several views of
this entity. Since a major principle of the object-oriented paradigm is the unicity of the object
identifier, each object or class must be uniquely identified. We propose to implement this
principle as follows: each view at level l of a multilevel object o (respectively a multilevel
class c) is uniquely identified by the pair (o,l) (respectively (c,l)).
• All single-level class and object views sharing the same security level are stored into a single-
level object-oriented database. Each single-level database can be managed as a non-protected
object-oriented database. However, in order to avoid unnecessary replications, we propose
implementing some dynamic links between the different single-level databases.
• Axiom (23) says that an attribute value Valv(o,a,v,l) must be propagated in all11 the levels l’ that
are just above the level l, where Val(o,a,v) is not referred as a cover story. We propose to
implement this axiom as follows: For all these level l’, Valv(o,a,v,l’) is evaluated using a
pointer to the view at level l. This pointer value is a syntactical expression which enables the
system to automatically retrieve the value v from the database of level l (see [BCGY94a] for
more details).
• By induction on axioms (21) and (24), we can easily prove that for all Honest predicates Pc the
following theorem can be derived:
                                                            
11
 Recall that we may have a partial order defined on the set of security levels
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∀t1K∀tn∀l∀ ′ l , P
v
(t1,K,tn , l) ∧ l ≤ ′ l → P
v
(t1,K, tn , ′ l )
It means in particular that every class attribute and every method belonging to a low level
database must be replicated in all higher classified databases. In order to implement a dynamic
replication mechanism, we introduce an inheritance link between any class view (c,l) and class
view (c,l’) with l being just below l’. Low-level attributes and low-level methods are then
automatically replicated to the higher level databases by inheritance.
8.2. Example of an implemented MultiView object-oriented database
Figure 5 corresponds to the example of a MultiView object-oriented database presented in
figure 4. For a better reading of the figure, inherited attributes and methods of each class view are
not shown. We appeal the reader’s attention to the following points:
• The views represented in figure 4 are now implemented as single-level databases.
• Any view at level l of a multilevel object o (respectively class c) is now uniquely identified by
a pair (o,l) (respectively (c,l)).
• Attribute values are automatically replicated by using pointers. For example, the value of the
Speed attribute of (FireFox,C) is evaluated using a pointer to the value mach 2 of the Speed
attribute of (FireFox,U). An arrow represents this pointer. This pointer is actually a syntactical
expression of the form “(FireFox,U).Speed”. More can be found about these pointers in
[BCGY94a]. Notice that thanks to these pointers, an update to an attribute value at a low level
would be automatically propagated to the higher levels.
• Attributes and methods are automatically replicated via inheritance links Isa1, Isa2, Isa3.
Notice that thanks to these inheritance links, an insertion of a new class attribute (or method) at
a low level would be automatically propagated to the higher levels.
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  (Supersonic_Aircraft,S)
    Attributes   
Nuclear_Bomb: boolean
     Methods   
Drop_Nuclear_Bomb
Isa
   ( Hypersonic_Aircraft,S)
    Attributes   
     Methods   
   ( Mirage,S)
Speed :
Range :
Weapons : {Gun, Bomb,
Rocket}
Nuclear_ Bomb: FALSE
Instance
   ( FireFox,S)
Speed : mach 6
Range :
Weapons :
Nuclear_ Bomb: TRUE
Boosters : 2
Instance
Instance
  (Supersonic_Aircraft,C)
    Attributes   
     Methods  
Isa
   ( Hypersonic_Aircraft,C)
    Attributes   
Boosters : integer
     Methods  
   ( Mirage,C)
Speed :
Range :
Weapons :
Instance
   ( FireFox,C)
Speed :
Range : 3000 km
Weapons :
Instance
  (Supersonic_Aircraft,U)
    Attributes  
Speed  : integer
Range : integer
Weapons : set of string
     Methods   
Automatic_Pilot
  (Mirage,U)
Speed : mach 2.5
Range : 1000 km
Weapons : {Gun, Bomb}
Instance
  (FireFox,U)
Speed : mach 2
Range : Restricted
Weapons : {Gun, Rocket,
Bomb}
Instance
Secret DB Confidential DB Unclassified DB
Isa1
Isa2
Isa3
Figure 5: Example of implementation of a MultiView object-oriented database
9. Conclusion
In this paper, our objective was to propose a complete and formal model for any type of multilevel
database. Definition of this model was done in three phases:
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• Non-protected database model: We defined a language based on first order logic. This language
allowed us to represent a database content including integrity constraints.
• Multilevel database model: We extended our language in order to protect each piece of
information represented by an atomic formula. We also derived some general theorems that
must be enforced when classifying the database content. Finally we provided a means to
introduce cover stories in the multilevel database.
• MultiView database model: We extended again our language in order to decompose the
multilevel database into a collection of single-level Views.
 Many multilevel security models for database (relational or object-oriented) have already been
presented by different authors [DLSSH88,Wil89,HOST90,SW92,CS95,QL96,JK90,Lun90,
ML92,KTT89]. However, each of these models is specific to a particular type of database,
relational [DLSSH88,Wil89,HOST90,SW92,CS95,QL96] or object-oriented
[JK90,Lun90,ML92,KTT89]. None of them proposes a methodology to formalize a multilevel
database in general. Moreover the use of polyinstantiation generates several ambiguities in most of
these models.
 Our model is complete, consistent and free of ambiguities:
• It is complete in the sense that given a set of integrity constraints of Type 1 or 2, we derive
from Rules 1 and 2 all and every possible inference control theorems.
• It is consistent since it is possible to build a model of our logical theory. For example, Figure
2 is a model of the logical theory representing a non protected object-oriented database, Figure
3 is a model of the logical theory representing a multilevel object-oriented database and Figure
4 is a model of the logical theory representing a MultiView object-oriented database.
• It is free of ambiguities since each concept used in this paper is formally defined using
mathematical logic. In particular, giving a formal definition for the concept of cover stories
certainly contributed to the clarification of this notion.
 In the last sections of this paper, we applied our general 3-layer approach to represent a
MultiView object-oriented database. This particular MultiView model for an object-oriented
database has already been presented in several papers [BCGY93a,BCGY93b,BCGY94a,CG96a]
and some of its results have been reused in other security models [SMKL95]. Compared to the
previous versions of this model, the new version presented in this paper shows two main
improvements:
• It includes explicit management of cover stories.
• It includes the possibility to have a partial order in the set of security levels.
The main use of our model is to build a multilevel database. However, we can also apply this
model to evaluate an existing multilevel database. For instance, we can check whether an existing
multilevel database respects the inference control rules Rule 1 and Rule 2. A useful extension to
this model could be then to define some guidelines that could be used to conform the existing
database to these inference control rules.
Our work is purely theoretical. In this  paper, we did not address the problem of implementation of
our model. However, we gave some basic implementation principles in the last section of this
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paper for the particular case of a MultiView object-oriented database. More can be found about
this topic in [BCGY93a,Gab95]. Another issue we did not consider here, is the problem of
updating a MultiView database. This issue remains to be investigated although some results are
presented in [Gab95].
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